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I

NOTE

I

INTERNATIONAL LAW-The Doctrine
of Sovereign Immunity-A Jurisdictional
Shield for Foreign Nations and their
Accountability for Human Rights
Violations, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.
Ct. 1471 (1993).
The crack of the whip, the clamp of the thumb screw, the crush of the
iron maiden, and in these more efficient modem times, the shock of
the electric cattle prod are forms of torture that the international order
will not tolerate. To subject a person to such horrors is to commit
one of the most egregious violations of the personal security and
dignity of a human being. That states engage in official torture
cannot be doubted, but all states believe it is wrong, all that engage
in torture deny it, and no state claims a sovereign right to
torture ....
Recently, in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,2 the Supreme Court had the
unique occasion to declare that the United States, in its dedication to the
promotion of human rights, would provide its domestic courts as forums
of redress for those suffering human rights abuses at the hands of foreign
governments.3 In particular, Nelson involved the claim of an American

1. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct 1471 (1993). Justice Souter delivered the opinion of
the Court. See id.
3. See Jennie Hatfield-Lyon, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia: An Opportunity for Judicial
Enforcement of Human Rights Standards, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 324, 337 (1992) (proffering that

Nelson served as an unusual opportunity for U.S. courts to signal to the international community that
the United States is a nation that gives preeminence to human rights concerns).
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left permanently disabled after thirty-nine days of torture inflicted by
Saudi officials.4 Despite the heinous abuses Nelson endured, the Court
opted to dismiss the suit in deference to the sovereign immunity of Saudi
Arabia.' As a result, the Court forever barred Nelson from receiving any
compensation or retribution for his suffering.
The atrocities Nelson suffered began in September 1983, when he
accepted a position as monitor systems engineer at the King Faisal
Specialist Hospital in Saudi Arabia.6 Nelson had learned of the position
through an employment agency that contracted with Saudi Arabia to
recruit Americans for employment at the Saudi hospital.7 In December
1983, Nelson and his wife departed for Saudi Arabia, and soon after,
Nelson began his work at the hospital.8 In March 1984, Nelson
discovered safety defects within the hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide
lines. 9 These defects posed fire hazards for those within the hospital.' °
Trying to effectively perform his duties, Nelson repeatedly reported the
hazards to hospital officials for several months, but the officials told him
to ignore his discovery." Eventually, Nelson reported the defects to a
Saudi government commission. 2

The United States previously has recognized human rights claims against individual
defendants. See Filartiga v. Pena-frala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that jurisdiction over
the claim of an individual tortured in Paraguay who later fled to the United States was proper
because the victim's oppressor also came to the United States). Nelson, however, is an action against
a foreign state. Actions like Nelson, in which human rights victims initiate litigation against a
foreign nation in U.S. courts, are the sole focus of this Note.
4. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475. In his written testimony to the Senate Immigration
Subcommittee, Nelson stated that, as a result of his torture, he was unable to work because he had
to undergo several medical operations and treatments. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989:
Hearingon S. 1629 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm.
of the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1990). In addition, he indicated that he suffered from
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id.
5. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1481. Traditionally, the notion of sovereignty has entailed the selfautonomy of foreign states and their rights to privacy, political independence, and territorial integrity.
See Louis Henkin, The Mythology ofSovereignty, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y of Int'l
Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar-May 1993, at 5. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (stating that "a given state's agreement to grant immunity in a particular
case is a matter of grace, comity, and respect for the equality and independence of other sovereigns").
6. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
7. Id. The employment agency was not a U.S. or Saudi Arabian company. Rather, the agency
was incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands. Id. at 1474.
8. Id. at 1475.
9. Id.
10. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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In retaliation for making these reports, the hospital officials solicited
Saudi government agents to arrest Nelson and take him to prison. 3
There, the authorities forced Nelson to do deep knee bends over a rod
until his knee joints separated and beat him from head to toe. 4
Moreover, Nelson had to fight other prisoners for food and was only
given fresh air and exercise once a week. 5
Prison guards told Nelson that he was being detained "to await trial
on unknown charges."' 6 However, the government never informed
Nelson's wife of his imprisonment. When she was finally told, the
authorities instructed her that she had to provide sexual favors to secure
Nelson's release.' 7 Finally, upon the request of a U.S. Senator, the
Saudi Arabian government released Nelson and returned him to the
United States.' 8
The Court's embrace of sovereign immunity in Nelson lends
credence to an emerging trend of lower federal court decisions in similar
human rights litigation. 9
In these decisions, courts have been
continually reluctant to confer domestic jurisdiction over human rights
disputes arising in foreign states.20 Accordingly, U.S. courts have set
precedent that the claims of human rights victims will be dismissed,
leaving these victims no legal recourse for their harm.2 ' Moreover, such

13. Id.
14. Id. See also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 68 (1990).
15. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See discussion infra parts ILA, Il.B.
20. See id Interestingly enough, the U.S. Senate exhibited this same reluctance when it ratified
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, but stipulated that U.S. courts are only obliged to hear torture victims' private actions
for damages when the acts of torture occur within its jurisdictional territory. 136 CONG. REC. S17486
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). See also In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1992).
Moreover, it appears that this tendency prevails throughout the international community. In
a statement made to the American Society of International Law (ASIL), Louis Henkin, 1993
President of the ASIL, contended that "'[s]overeignty' is commonly trumpeted today as a basis for
resisting external intervention, even by the [U.N.] Security Council." Henkin, supra note 5, at 7.
Henkin further asserted that sovereignty has evolved to become a means of avoiding international
condemnation, as some states use sovereignty to prevent the investigation and discovery of atrocities
occurring within their own boundaries. Id. at 6.
21. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrierto Human Rights Litigation-IsAmendment
Necessary and Possible?,86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 324, 344 (1992). For the most part, human rights
victims like Nelson seek redress in U.S. courts because the courts of the governments inflicting the
abuse deny them justice. Id. at 344. Such is the case in Saudi Arabia, where "arbitrary detention is
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precedent establishes sovereign immunity as a shield for foreign nations
and their accountability for human rights violations. Ironically, this trend
continues despite the United States' affirmation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and its precept that all individuals have the
right to an effective legal remedy for violations of fundamental human
rights,22 with no exception being made on the basis of jurisdiction.23
I. The American Concept of Sovereign Immunity
To fully comprehend the role of sovereign immunity in human rights
litigation brought before U.S. courts, the evolution of the American
concept of sovereign immunity must be understood. The United States
first acknowledged the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1812, in
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.2 4 America's early view of sovereign
immunity followed the absolute theory. Under this theory, a sovereign

routine, torture common, and redress rare for the victims." Recoursefor Americans Abused Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1993, at A32.
Furthermore, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee
Affairs, Nelson indicated that while imprisoned, the Saudi officials made him sign a paper written
in Arabic, which he did not understand. Torture Victim ProtectionAct of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1990). Conceivably, this paper could have been a release exculpating
Saudi officials from liability within their courts.
22. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law." UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(111),
art. 8, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The U.S. Constitution guarantees fundamental human
rights. Accordingly, human rights advocates have espoused that Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights mandates that domestic courts issue an effective remedy of judgment
against any violator of human rights law. Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights in U.S. Courts, 10 MICH.
J.INT'L L. 543, 611, 651-52 (1989). See also Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to
Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunityfor Violations of InternationalLaw
Under the FSIA, 8 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 49, 71 (1985).
23. Article two of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore,no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,jurisdictionalor
internationalstatus of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be
independent, trust, non self-governing, or any other limitation of sovereignty.
UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 2, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)
(emphasis added).
24. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
25. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: A FunctionalApproach to the CommercialActivity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 490, 495
(1992) (propounding that courts traditionally trace the U.S. doctrine of sovereign immunity to The
Schooner Exchange case). See also Renana B. Abrams, FSIA: Direct Effect Exception, 5 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 211, 212 (1991); Melissa L. Werthan et a, Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Governments: A Comprehensive Review of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 VAND. J.
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could never be subject to the jurisdictional authority of another
sovereign." Thus, inSchooner Exchange, France's immunity defense
prevailed over an American's assertion of title over a French warship
docked within U.S. territorial waters."
For 140 years following Schooner Exchange, the United States
continued to adhere to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.2s In
1952, however, as U.S. participation in international commercial activity
proliferated, commercial litigation increased. U.S. companies needed a
means for resolving legal disputes with foreign states with whom they
Consequently, the Executive Branch
conducted business. 9
commissioned the Tate Letter, which announced the adoption of a
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.3" Under the restrictive theory,
states retain immunity for their governmental or public nature acts (jure
imperii), but lose immunity for their private or commercial acts (ure
gestionis). I
The United States' modem concept of sovereign immunity 3is2
embodied within the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA).
Enacted in 1976, the FSIA codifies the restrictive doctrine of sovereign
immunity. 3 It grants blanket immunity to foreign states, but enumerates
six exceptions to this immunity.34 Specifically, these exceptions provide
that foreign states can be brought before U.S. district courts in instances
involving (1) waivers of immunity; (2) commercial activity in the United
States or commercial activity in connection with or having a direct effect
upon the United States; (3) property taken in violation of international
law; (4) immovable property in the United States; (5) noncommercial
torts occurring within the United States; and (6) actions brought to
enforce arbitration agreements between private parties and foreign
states.35

TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 121 (1986).
26. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 433 (3d ed. 1991).

27. The Schooner Exchange, 116 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
28. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486.
29. Letter from Jack B. Tate, acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to acting Attorney
General Phillip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988).
33. Werthan et al., supra note 25, at 124.
34. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-5.
35. See id. § 1604. Section 1604 of the FSIA provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the
time of enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 21, 1976] a foreign state shall be immune
from jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
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II. The FSIA in the Context of Human Rights Litigation
In Argentine Republic v. AmeradaHess Shipping Corp., the Supreme
Court affirmed that the FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state" in U.S. courts. 6 Therefore, immunity
is presumptively granted unless one of the FSIA exceptions can be
invoked." Unfortunately for human rights victims, the FSIA exceptions
serve as "poorly-fitting garments."3"
Of the six FSIA immunity
exceptions, only the language of the waiver and commercial activity
exceptions are arguably applicable to cases in which the human rights
abuses have occurred in foreign states.
Even under these two
exceptions, however, the judiciary has been hesitant to confer its
jurisdiction over the authority of foreign states. Instead, it has chosen to
strictly interpret the language of these two exceptions. Consequently,

Id. (emphasis added). See also id. § 1605 (enumerating the specific exceptions to immunity as
referred to by § 1604); id. § 1606 (exempting foreign states from being held liable for punitive
damages); 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (delineating the parameters for which foreign states will be granted
immunity for counterclaims).
36. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 429,443 (1989). Amerada
Hess arose during the Falkland Island War, when Argentinian military aircraft severely damaged a
crude oil tanker in international waters. The owners of the tanker, two Liberian companies,
attempted to bring suit in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 432. The Alien Tort Statute provides that "[tihe district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations, or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
The Liberians asserted that jurisdiction under the Alien Torts Statute was appropriate because
Congress never repealed the Statute when the FSIA was enacted. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 436-39.
However, the court refuted this argument, determining that Congress failed to repeal the Alien Tort
Statute because it was uncertain as to whether the Statute conferred jurisdiction in suits against
foreign states. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Alien Tort Statute did not supersede
the FSIA. Id.
37. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438-39.
38. Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 341 (asserting that "the drafting of the FSIA means that these
[human rights] litigants must attempt to squeeze their cases into one of the poorly fitting garments
of the FSIA's codified exceptions, almost always unsuccessfully").
39. The non-commercial tort exception only extends jurisdiction to cases in which "money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign
state." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (emphasis added). Consequently, for human rights victims suffering
abuses in foreign states, this exception is inapplicable.
For example, U.S. hostages who brought suit against the Iranians holding them hostage in the
U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979 were denied jurisdiction under this exception. The courts held the
exception to be inapplicable, determining that the U.S. Embassy in Iran was not considered territory
of the United States for purposes of the non-commercial tort immunity exception. See, e.g.,
Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984);
McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984);
Ledgerwood v. State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1985).
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human rights victims' endeavors to tailor their claims into one of these
two exceptions have been unsuccessful.
A. Nelson: An Attempt Under the Commercial Exception
Nelson represents a defeat for human rights victims seeking
jurisdiction under the FSIA's commercial activity exception." Under
the commercial activity exception, a foreign government will not be
immune from suits when
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
4
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. '
In short, a foreign state can be brought before American courts if it (1)
engages in commercial acts within the United States; (2) performs acts in
the United States that are "in connection" with the foreign states'
commercial activity performed elsewhere; or (3) performs commercial
acts outside the United States that cause a "direct effect" within the
United States.42
Arguably, Nelson's claim could be classified under the first or
second prong of the commercial exception. Nelson contended that Saudi
Arabia's contract with the employment agency to recruit U.S. workers
was commercial activity conducted in or at least "in connection with"
commercial activity in the United States. 43 However, the Court never
even addressed this issue, opining that the employment contract was not
the impetus for the claim.44 Rather, it determined that Nelson's suit
revolved around the human rights abuses, and such tortious conduct could
not constitute commercial activity. 45 Indeed, the Court concluded that
these actions exemplified Saudi abuse of its police power. 46 The Court
further noted that "however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be,"
police powers traditionally have been deemed public, governmental acts

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
Id.
See id.
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 1476 (1993).
Id. at 1479-80.
Id.
Id.
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and, for this
under the FSIA's restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
47
reason, Saudi Arabia should be afforded immunity.
Nelson is not the only human rights defeat under the commercial
activity exception. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
another analogous human rights case, Martin v. Republic of South Africa,
a case brought under the third prong of the commercial exception, the
"direct effect" exception.48 In Martin, a black professional dancer
performing with his troupe in South Africa was injured in an automobile
accident while there. 49 Because of the South African policy of
apartheid, Martin was denied emergency medical care. As a result of his
injuries, Martin became a quadriplegic. 50 Upon his return to the United
States, Martin brought suit, contending that the constant pain and
treatment he suffered as a result of the permanent injury received in
South Africa was sufficient to establish that the injury had a "direct
effect" in the United States. 5'
The Second Circuit ultimately determined that Martin's primary
injury occurred in South Africa.52 It reasoned that any pain or medical
treatment he endured while in the United States was merely an indirect
consequence of the primary injury and, thus, did not satisfy the "direct
effect" requirement.5 3 In making its determination, the court relied upon
Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc.54 and Upton v. Empire of Iran.5 In
these cases, the courts held that in personal injury or wrongful death
cases where the primary injury occurs in a foreign country, any
subsequent pain or pecuniary loss suffered after the individual returns to
the United States is an indirect consequence of the primary injury.56
Therefore, the courts denied jurisdiction, deducing that such indirect

47. Id. at 1481.
48. Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 95.
53. Martin, 836 F.2d at 95.
54. Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that an American's
subsequent physical pain and medical expenses endured while in the United States after having been
exposed to large doses of radiation in Mexico was not a sufficient "direct effect" as defined by the
FSIA).
55. Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), affdmem., 607 F.2d 494 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (determining that even though an injury caused by a roof collapse at a Tehran airport
caused subsequent physical pain and suffering for the victim while in the United States, such
subsequent pain and suffering did not constitute a direct effect).
56. Zernicek, 826 F.2d at 419; Upton, 459 F. Supp. at 266.

THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

consequences were too attenuated to be classified as having a "direct
effect" upon the United States.
B. Waiver Exception: the PreferredException for Human Rights
Litigation
Human rights advocates have constructed an especially cogent and
convincing argument as to the applicability of the waiver exception to
human rights abuses foreign states commit in their countries." Under
the FSIA, foreign states currently may be brought before U.S. courts
when "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
implication."59 A foreign state can effectuate a waiver of a state's
immunity in several ways. It can explicitly waive immunity through
express language in contracts or treaties.6" In addition, the legislative
history of the FSIA specifically contemplates three examples of implied
waivers. Namely, a state can impliedly waive its immunity when (1)it
agrees to arbitrate in another country; (2) it agrees that a contract is
governed by the law of a particular country; or (3) it files a responsive
pleading in a case without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.6
Human rights advocates rely upon the concept of jus cogens in
extending the waiver exception to the context of human rights. Jus
cogens, as defined by the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, are "rules of international law [that] are
recognized by the international community of states as peremptory,
permitting no derogation. 2 Jus cogens is "so overriding of other legal
precepts, so preemptive of sovereignty, that a treaty or other international
rule inconsistent with such norms is by definition invalid." 3 Jus cogens

57. Zernicek, 826 F.2d at 419; Upton, 459 F. Supp. at 266. See also Berkowitz v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 587 F. Supp. 329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct 510 (1984); Close v. American
Airlines, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Harris v. VAO Intourist Moscow, 481 F. Supp.
1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
58. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 342. See also Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of
International Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365 (1989). The case, Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.
Fla. 1993), represents a human rights claim satisfying the express waiver requirement. However, in
cases where explicit waivers of immunity do not exist, attempts to satisfy the implicit waiver
exception have been made. See, e.g., Denegri v. Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233
(D.D.C. Apr. 3, 1992); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
59. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
60. Werthan et al., supra note 25, at 125-26.
61. Id.at 126-27.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
cmt. k (1987).
63. Pl.'s Supplemental Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss, at 12, Denegri v. Chile, No. 863085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992).
395
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proscribes a limited set of activities so reprehensible that a state cannot
pursue them under any circumstances.64 Examples of such acts include
genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination, and gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.65
Accordingly, human rights advocates proffer that when a state
performs actions proscribed by jus cogens, it impliedly waives its
sovereign immunity, as no state is authorized to violate jus cogens.66
In this manner, human rights litigation would appropriately come under
the FSIA implied waiver exception. While this argument has been
advanced in litigation, U.S. courts have yet to impart jurisdiction under
it.
In Denegri v. Chile,6 7 Chilean soldiers arbitrarily detained two
teenage activists participating in a student protest in Chile in 1986. The
soldiers then doused the two with gasoline and set them on fire, killing
one of the youths.68 The surviving teenager and her parents along with
the deceased child's mother brought suit against the Chilean government
in the U.S. District Court. Specifically, the victims asserted that the
soldiers' actions of torture violated jus cogens, and therefore, Chile
impliedly waived its immunity. 69 The court refused to acknowledge this
assertion, holding that the argument was a novel one unsupported by case
law.7"
Indeed, the FSIA, the FSIA's legislative history, and the
Supreme Court's holding in Amerada all mandated that the FSIA be
strictly interpreted. 7 ' Consequently, the court opined that Congress did
not intend violations of peremptory norms to fall within the purview of
the FSIA waiver exception and, thus, dismissed the claim for lack of
jurisdiction.72
The Ninth Circuit reiterated this position in Siderman de Blake v.
Republic ofArgentina, a case instituted after Argentinian military officials
kidnapped and tortured Siderman because he was Jewish.73 For one
week, the soldiers beat and applied electric shock to Siderman. While

64.
65.
(1987).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

396

See id.
RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 702

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 342.
Denegri v. Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Denegri, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, at *11.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
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torturing him, the soldiers repeatedly shouted anti-Semitic epithets.74
Subsequently, the Sidermans fled to the United States, where they
instituted an action against the Republic of Argentina.75 Similar to
Denegri, Siderman asserted that torture constituted a violation ofjus
cogens.76 The court again refused to hold that a violation of jus cogens
fell under the FSIA exceptions to immunity."
III. Conclusion
The United States enjoys a rich tradition of providing substantial
support for human rights.78 Indeed, concern for human rights has been
associated with most of the major politico-legal developments in the
United States.79 Concomitantly, however, the United States has long
respected the political sovereignty of foreign states.80 In cases like
Nelson, where the two histories conflict, courts have strictly interpreted
the provisions of the FSIA, resulting in the preservation of sovereignty
and a loss for human rights. Unfortunately, the judiciary appears to have
ignored that when human rights are at stake, "the pretended cloak of
sovereignty ends where international law begins.""'
In 1992, Congress attempted to redirect concern for human rights
with its enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act. 2 The Act
provides both U.S. citizens and aliens the opportunity to file civil suits

74. Id. at 703.
75. Id. at 703.
76. Id.at 715-19.
77. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 713-19. Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit did acknowledge that
U.S. courts may have had jurisdiction over Siderman's claim, but not for reasons ofjus cogens.
Siderman alleged that after he fled from Argentina, the Argentinian government feigned criminal
proceedings, claiming that Siderman was guilty of initiating a fraudulent sale of land. Id.at 722.
The Argentinian government then solicited the Los Angeles Superior Court for help in serving papers
giving notice of Siderman's impending prosecution. Id.Siderman asserted that the Argentineans
merely sought to obtain his return so that they could further torture or even kill him. Id The Ninth
Circuit pronounced that if Siderman's allegations were true, Argentina deliberately attempted to
involve the United States in its design to torture Siderman. Id.at 722-32. In this manner, Argentina
would have implicitly waived its immunity before U.S. courts. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 722-23.
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the lower court for the appropriate factual
determination. ld Cf de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that
the FSIA would not protect a foreign state from civil liability if it ordered an assassination that took
place in the United States).
78. Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights in US. Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 650 (1989)
(documenting the use of human rights precepts in judicial opinions).
79. Id.
80. See discussion supra parts I, II.
81. Jordan J. Paust, Draft BriefConcerningClaims to ForeignSovereign Immunity and Human
Rights: Nonimmunity for Violations of InternationalLaw Under the Sea, 8 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 49,
59 (19851.
82. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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against their oppressors in U.S. courts, provided that (1) the torturer acted
under the authority of his or her government, (2) the torturer is subject
to personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts, and (3) the victim exhausted all
available remedies within the country where the torture occurred. s3
However, the Torture Victim Protection Act confers jurisdiction only over
individual defendants.84 Therefore, for cases such-as Nelson, where the
oppressor was a foreign government, victims will still be denied
jurisdiction in U.S. courts, unless their claims fall under the FSIA
exceptions.
Seemingly, this jurisdictional problem can be resolved by amending
the FSIA to include a specific human rights exception. 5 Opponents of
such an exception emphasize that some foreign states might perceive the
exception as an excessive intrusion into their political autonomy, and in
retaliation, these nations may subject Americans to politically motivated
litigation within their own foreign courts.86 Thus, those disagreeing
with a human rights exception advocate that U.S. efforts would be better
directed toward promoting the existing international fora in which human
rights can be vindicated.87 Currently, however, even these fora are
limited, as they only have authority over those nations who consent to
being brought before them.88 Consequently, for individuals victimized

83. See id. For more discussion on the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989, see 137 CONG.
REC. E1444 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1991) (statement of Rep. Yatron).
84. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
85. See Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 3, at 324; Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 324. Both authors
strongly advocate the inclusion of a human rights exception for the FSIA.
86. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 343.
87. See id.
88. Victims of human rights abuses may bring complaints before both U.N. and regional fora.
In particular, victims can submit complaints to committees created by U.N. human rights treaties.
See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, May 7, 1966, art. 14, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 1.L.M. 352 (1966); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
DegradingTreatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 5I, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1985). See also Cynthia Price Cohen, InternationalForafor the Vindication of
Human Rights Violated by the U.S. InternationalPopulation Policy, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 241 (1987). While these committees do not adjudicate per se, the committees do publicly
condemn states abusing human rights in the hope of deterring future abuses. Id. at 253. These U.N.
bodies can appropriately review actions of those nations that are signatories to either U.N. human
rights treaties or the U.N. Charter itself. Id. at 253-55.
Additionally, countries in three regions including Europe, the Americas, and Africa have
adopted human rights treaties that provide for the adjudication of human rights complaints before
regional human rights commissions. See, e.g., European Conventionfor the Protection of Human
Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into
force July 18, 1978); Banjul Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights, June 28, 1981, art. 9, O.A.U.

THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

by nations that refuse to consent to the jurisdiction of international fora,
the FSIA stands as the only viable means for seeking redress against
foreign state oppressors.
At present, the FSIA subsumes human rights values.89 With the
FSIA's apparent inapplicability to human rights contexts, victims are
subject to another terrorization, namely the denial of a legal remedy.
Accordingly, sovereign immunity serves as both a shield, deflecting any
accountability for human rights abuses foreign states commit, and as a
sword, destroying any opportunity for human rights victims to obtain the
recognition of the inherent dignity owed to all members of the human
family. 90 For this reason, Congress must consider a human rights
exception. To do otherwise would disrespect the fundamental human
rights afforded all peoples.
Michelle Fastiggi

Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 50
(1982). Similar to the U.N. fora, only those nations who are signatories to the treaties can be
brought before the regional commissions. Cohen, supra, at 263.
89. Henkin, supra note 5, at 5. (stating that "'[s]overeignty' sometimes subsumes-and
conceals-important values").
90. As enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "Recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice, and peace in the world." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (111), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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